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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
In this consolidated appeal of four separate cases, Curtis Glenn Hartshorn
contends the district court erred in conducting a hearing on Hartshorn's postjudgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. CR-2006-0019594
(Docket No. 33917) without first appointing counsel, and abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 35 motions in all four cases.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs
On March 24, 2006, the state charged Hartshorn with delivery of a
controlled substance in Bonneville County Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No.
33914). (#33914 R., pp.6-7.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hartshorn pled

guilty to an amended charge of possession with intent to deliver and the state
agreed to dismiss the charges in four other cases. (#33914 R., pp.17-18, 26-30.)
The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Hartshorn on probation for five years.
(#33914 R., pp.46-52.)
Less than three months later, the state charged Hartshorn with escape in
Bonneville County Case No. CR-06-14327 (Docket No. 33915). (#33915 R.,
pp.4-5.) In the three months following the escape charge, the state charged
Hartshorn with grand theft and aggravated assault in Bonnevifle County Case
No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), and with four counts of issuing a check
without funds in Bonneviile County Case No. CR-06-17236 (Docket No. 33916).
(#33916 R., pp.4-5; #33917 R., pp.4-5.)

Hartshorn entered into a plea

agreement which disposed of the charges in all three new cases. Specifically,
Hartshorn pled guilty to Escape in Case No. CR-06-14327, one count of issuing
checks without funds in Case No. CR-06-17236, and grand theft in Case No. CR06-19594, and the state dismissed the remaining counts alleged in those cases.
(#33915 R., pp.14-18; #33916 R., pp.14-18; #33917 R., pp.14-18.)

Prior to

sentencing in these three cases, Hartshorn submitted a letter requesting
withdrawal of his guilty pleas.

(Letter filed December 7, 2006 ("Letter")

(Augmentation); #33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-12.) Hartshorn also requested
withdrawal of his guilty plea in Case No. CR-06-5769. (Letter.)
The court conducted a hearing on Hartshorn's motion at which Hartshorn
was represented by counsel. (#33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-12.) At that
hearing, Hartshorn agreed to withdraw his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas if
the court would proceed to sentencing using the PSI prepared in relation to Case
No. CR-06-5769. (#33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-21.) The court agreed, and
the cases proceeded to sentencing. (#33915, R., p 25.) At that same hearing,
Hartshorn admitted he violated his probation in Case No. CR-06-5769 and
agreed to disposition of that violation that same day. (#33915, Tr., p.27, Ls.811.) The court thereafter imposed sentence as follows: (1) one year fixed for the
escape conviction in Case No. CR-06-14327, consecutive to the sentence
imposed in Case No. CR-06-17236; (2) three years fixed for the insufficient fund
check conviction in Case No. CR-06-17236, concurrent with the sentence
imposed in Case No. CR-06-5769; (3) twelve years with four years fixed for the
grand theft conviction in Case No. CR-06-19594, concurrent with the sentences

imposed in Case Nos. CR-06-5769 and -17236. (#33915 R., pp.26-27; #33916

R., pp.39-42; #33917 R., pp.40-43.) In Case No. CR-06-5759, the court revoked
Hartshorn's probation and ordered his sentence executed. (#33914 R., pp.6063.)
Hartshorn filed a Rule 35 motion in all four cases

(see #33914 R., pp.64-

74'1, which the court denied on January 22, 2007 (#33917 R., pp.48-49).
Hartshorn filed timely notices of appeal from the entry of judgment (#33914 R.,
pp.84-89; #33915 R., pp.36-41; #33916 R., pp.51-55; #33917 R., pp.50-55), and
the Idaho Supreme Court granted his motion to consolidate all four cases for
purposes of appeal (Order Granting Motion to Consolidate dated March 15,
2007).
While his appeals were pending, Hartshorn filed a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917). (Motion
to Withdraw Alford Plea filed October 1, 2007 (Augmentation)). The district court
denied the motion after a hearing at which Hartshorn appeared pro se via
telephone. (Minute Entry from February 12, 2008 hearing (Augmentation); Order
Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum Decision filed
March 20, 2008 (Augmentation); Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Withdraw
Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum Decision filed March 20, 2008
(Augmentation).)

' The Rule 35 motion is not included in the record on appeal in Docket Nos.

33915, 33916, or 33917. However, the Rule 35 motion included in the record in
Docket No. 33914 references all four cases. (#33914 R., p.64.) Additionally, the
caption on the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing in the record references all four
cases. (See 1/22/07 Tr. (hereinafter "Rule 35 Tr.").)

ISSUES
Hartshorn states the issues on appeal as:
I. Did the district court deny Mr. Hartshorn his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where defense counsel was not present?

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr.
2.
Hartshorn's Rule 35 motion?
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Should this Court conclude that a post-judgment motion to withdraw a
1.
guilty plea is a collateral attack on the judgment and, as such, does not constitute
a critical stage that would entitle a defendant to the appointment of counsel?
Has Hartshorn failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing
2.
discretion by denying his request for Rule 35 relief?

ARGUMENT

I.
Hartshorn Has Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Counsel At The Hearina On
His Post-Judament Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Hartshorn asserts the hearing on his post-judgment motion to withdraw his

guilty plea was a critical stage such that he had a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.)

Hartshorn is incorrect.

Because

Hartshorn's post-judgment was a collateral attack on his conviction, it was not a
critical stage, and he was not entitled to counsel. Hartshorn has, therefore, failed
to establish error in the district court's failure to appoint counsel or inform
Hartshorn of the risks of proceeding pro se.
B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review for claims of constitutional violations is one of

deference to factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but we exercise
free review in the application of the constitutional principles to the facts once
established." State v. Avelar, 124 ldaho 317, 322, 859 P.2d 353, 358 (Ct. App.
1993).
C.

Hartshorn Had No Sixth Amendment Riaht To Be Represented By
Counsel On His Post-Judgment Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to

counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him.
Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2007) (citing

United

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 ldaho 638, 637

P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does
not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,
336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).

"The

determination whether [a] hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the provision of
counsel depends . . . upon an analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inheres in the * * * confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice."' Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (quoting
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
It is well-established that "entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor
or a felony charge, ranks as a 'critical stage' at which the right to counsel
adheres." Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (citing Araersinaer v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam)).
However, neither the Supreme Court nor any Idaho appellate court has ever
addressed whether a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitutes
a "critical stage" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. While, as Hartshorn

notes, a some courts that have addressed the issue have determined that
motions to withdraw guilty pleas are critical stages to which a defendant is
entitled to counsel (E

Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13 (citing cases)), this position is

not unanimous, and some of the cases upon which Hartshorn relies have only
held that the right to counsel exists in the context of pre-judgment motions to
withdraw a guilty plea, as opposed to post-judgment motions.
In State v. Winston, 19 P.3d 495, 496 (Wash. App. 2001), the Washington
Court of Appeals held: "A convicted defendant who moves in the trial court to

withdraw a guilty plea months after entry of his judgment and sentence is not
constitutionally entitled to appointment of counsel even if the trial court grants a
hearing on the motion." The court further explained:
[Elven if the trial court had actually determined that Winston's plea
withdrawal motion alleged sufficient facts to warrant a hearing
under [the state criminal rules], Winston still would not have had a
constitutional right to appointment of counsel to represent him at
the hearing. He argues that a postconviction hearing is a critical
stage requiring appointment of counsel because it "presents a
possibility of prejudice" to the defendant. While the possibility of
prejudice is indeed a factor to be considered in deciding whether a
particular hearing is a critical stage, Winston has put the cart before
the horse. The preliminary question, under Pennsylvania v. Finley,
is whether the hearing addresses an application for postconviction
relief other than the first direct appeal of right. If it does, there is no
constitutional right to counsel. Here, the time period had long
expired during which Winston was constitutionally entitled to have
counsel appointed. The hearing held by the trial court on Winston's
postconviction motion was not a critical stage of the prosecution, no
matter how great the potential for prejudice due to the legal and
factual obstacles that Winston faced in attempting to withdraw his
plea.
Id. at 499 (internal citation omitted)
In Ohio, the appellate courts have concluded that although a court may
appoint counsel to represent a defendant in relation to a post-judgment motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, or must, under state law, notify the public defender's office
and "allow it to decide whether to represent [a] defendant" on such a motion if the
court determines an evidentiary hearing is required, a defendant is not
constitutionally entitled to counsel to prepare or present a post-judgment motion
to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Meadows, 2006 WL 1450643 (Ohio App. 6
Dist. 2006) (unpublished)

In Kansas, a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing only requires
counsel if the motion "reveals facts which, if true, would show manifest injustice
such that withdrawal of the plea may be warranted." State v. Jackson, 874 P.2d
1138, 1142 (Kan. 1994); compare State v. Taylor, 975 P.2d 1196, 1201 (Kan.
1999) ("There is no constitutional right to counsel at each and every postconviction proceeding or motion. However, if a hearing is held and the State is
represented, the defendant should be represented by conflict-free counsel unless
the defendant waives the right to counsel.") (citations and quotations omitted);
State v. Toney, 187 P.3d 138, 141 (Kan. App. 2008) ("Given that a hearing was
held on Toney's motion to withdraw plea and the State was represented, Toney
had a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at the hearing.") Conversely, if
the motion to withdraw a plea "fails to raise substantial questions of law or triable
issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, legal arguments, and/or briefs of
the parties, then the motion does not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings
and due process does not require appointment of counsel."

Id.

The Montana

Supreme Court has similarly concluded that the right to counsel in relation to a
post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea depends on whether the motion
"raise[s] the potential for substantial prejudice." State v. Garner, 36 P.3d 346,
356 (Mont. 2001).
Although the federal circuit court cases cited by Hartshorn undoubtedly
hold that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment, those cases involve prejudgment motions to
withdraw and do not address whether the right to counsel would apply equally to

8

a post-judgment motion.

See

United States v. Davis, 239 F.3d 283 (2" Cir.

2001); United States v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Sanchez-Boreto, 93 F.3d 17 (1'' Cir. 1996); United States v. White, 659 F.2d 231
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to set aside guilty plea based, in part,
on ineffective assistance of counsel at pre-sentencing motion to withdraw guilty
plea where defendant had right to effective assistance); United States v.
Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3rdCir. 1976); see also United States v. Seqarra-Rivera,
473 F.3d 381 (2007); Forbes v. United States, 2009 WL 2256017 (2" Cir. 2009).
In fact, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I l ( d ) , which governs plea
withdrawals, expressly prohibits motions to withdraw guilty pleas after sentence.
The rule states:

"After the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not

withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the plea may be set aside only
on direct appeal or collateral attack." F.R.Crim.P. Il(d)(e).
Most of the state cases cited by Hartshorn also involved pre-judgment
motions.

Browninq v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360 (Va. Ct. App. 1994);

Beals v. State, 802 P.2d 2 (Nev. 1990); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992); People v. Holmes, 297 N.E.2d 204 (111. App. Ct. 1973)'

But see

Ducker v. State, 986 So.2d 1224 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); People v. Cabrales, 756

Wartshorn also relies on Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993);
however, it is unclear from the court's opinion in that case whether the motion to
withdraw was made prior to sentencing although it appears it likely was unless
the court sentenced the defendant between the date he entered his plea on
December 6, and the date the motion was filed on December 13.

N.E.2d 461 (111. App. 2 Dist. ~ooI).~ It appears only two states, Washington and
Florida, have specifically addressed whether there is a distinction between preand post-judgment motions for purposes of deciding whether a defendant is
entitled to be represented by counsel on the motion. As noted above, the
Washington Court of Appeals has held that a defendant is not entitled to counsel
on a post-judgment motion to withdraw his plea. Winston, supra.
Florida courts, on the other hand, have concluded there is a right to
counsel under such circumstances, reasoning that a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea does not constitute a collateral attack on the defendant's conviction (in
which he would not be entitled to counsel) because such a motion is permitted,
by rule, to be filed within the thirty-day window for filing an appeal and the denial
of such a motion may be included as an issue on direct appeal. See, e.g.,
Padqett v. State, 743 So.2d 70, 72-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). This logic,
however, seems to suggest that the right to counsel for a post-judgment motion
is not without limits; that is, the right only exists if the motion is filed within the
thirty-day period provided for in the applicable state rule. Indeed, Georgia courts
have expressed a similar type of limitation.
In Georgia, a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel on a postjudgment motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea. See, e.g., Fortson v.

State, 532 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2000). However, this right does not continue in
perpetuity regardless of when the motion was filed. As explained in Coleman v.

' Although Hartshorn did not cite Ducker or Cabrales, a review of those opinions
reveal that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and at least one appellate
court in Illinois have concluded the right to counsel exists in relation to a postjudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

State, 343 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1986), a "trial court may exercise discretion and
refuse a request to appointed counsel on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed
after the term of the court at which the judgment of conviction was rendered."
(Citations omitted.)
None of the cases cited by Hartshorn provide any compelling basis for
concluding that a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical
stage that entitles a defendant, as a matter of constitutional law, to courtappointed counsel. Such a motion is properly characterized as a collateral attack
on the judgment, which, under Supreme Court precedent, has no associated
right to counsel. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336-37; Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. That
the ability to file such a motion can be restricted or even limited as a matter of
court rule,

see F.R.Crirn.P.

ll(d), supports this proposition - if a court can take

away the right to file a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, it cannot
be a critical stage.
To the extent Hartshorn's argument is premised on the theory that
because a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be filed during a period where a
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel for a particular purpose, such as
an appeal, the motion also involves a critical stage, such an argument fails. For
example, there is no constitutional right to counsel at a presentence interview
even though it occurs between the guilty plea and sentencing, both of which are
clearly critical stages under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.a., State v. Kauk, 691
N.W.2d 606 (S.D. 2005) (rejecting right of counsel at presentence interview and
citing cases); United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1995)

("[Tlhe presentence interview is not a critical stage of the adversary proceedings,
whether viewed in the context of pre- or post-Guideline law"); United States v.
Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1517 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe presentence interview is
not a critical stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment"), cerf. denied, 828 511 U.S. 1020 (1994); United States v. Bounds,
985 F.2d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[Wle have previously rejected this argument,
reasoning that no right to counsel attaches at a presentence interview, as the
interview is not a critical stage of the proceedings").
Furthermore, it would be anomalous to require the appointment of counsel
on a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but not require the
appointment of counsel when the defendant seeks to withdraw his plea through a
post-conviction petition, since either mechanism can be used to challenge the
validity of the plea.

a Ricca v. State, 124 ldaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987

(Ct. App. 1993).
In Idaho, the only right to counsel available to Hartshorn in relation to his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is that provided in I.C. § 19-852.

See State v.

m,125 ldaho 522, 523-524, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Right" to
counsel in pursuit of a Rule 35 motion "may be denied if the trial court finds that
the motion 'is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
proceeding.' I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).").

However, Hartshorn neither requested

counsel pursuant to this statute (or at all) when he filed his motion, nor has he

argued on appeal that counsel should have been appointed under the ~ t a t u t e . ~
As such, whether Hartshorn would be entitled to counsel pursuant to I.C. 19852(3) is not before this Court for c~nsideration.~
State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259,
923 P.2d 966 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions
of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."); State v. Martin, 119
ldaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991) (noting long-standing rule in ldaho
that an appellate court will not consider issues which are presented for the first
time on appeal).
Because there is no constitutional right to be represented by counsel with
respect to a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and because
Hartshorn has failed to preserve or assert any other right to counsel, Hartshorn's
claim that he was denied his right to counsel at the hearing on his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea fails.

In footnote 13 of his brief, Hartshorn notes he was appointed counsel in Case
No. CR-06-19594 on November 9, 2006 (the date he was arraigned) and that the
court order appointing the State Appellate Public Defender "retained the
Bonneville County Public Defender's Office 'for all purposes other than appeal."'
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 n.13 (citing [#33917] R., p.61)). in footnote 14, Hartshorn
states: "The record does not disclose why appointed counsel was not present."
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 n. 14.) According to the Register of Actions for Case No.
CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), which is attached to the Motion to Augment
Record and Motion to Keep Suspension of Briefing Schedule in Place that
Hartshorn filed on November 24, 2008, a Notice of Withdrawal was filed on April
6, 2007, six months prior to the date Hartshorn filed his motion to withdraw his
plea. Presumably, counsel's withdrawal is the reason he was not present at the
hearing.
Hartshorn has also not challenged whether the district court erred in denying
his motion. (SeeAppellant's Brief, p.1I(statement of issues).)

II.
Hartshorn Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denvinq His Request For Rule 35 Relief
A.

Introduction
Hartshorn contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his

Rule 35 motions given the information he presented at sentencing and "[iln light
of his substance abuse problems and his commitment to turning his life around."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Harthsorn's claim fails. Given Hartshorn's extensive
criminal history and his repeated victimization of others, Hartshorn's substance
abuse and alleged "commitment to turning his life around" hardly establish his
sentences were excessive as imposed.

Moreover, Hartshorn has failed to

establish he was entitled to Rule 35 relief because he failed to present any new
information in support of his motion, much less any information that would weigh
in favor of a reduction of any of his sentences.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the question before this Court is not what sentences it would

have imposed, but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion.
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, -,

191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v.

Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)).
C.

Hartshorn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Denvinn His Rule 35 Motion
"The 'primary consideration [in imposing sentence] is, and presumptively

always will be, the good order and protection of society."' State v. Butcher, 137
ldaho 125, 137, 44 P.3d 1180, 1192 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Moore, 78

ldaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)). Other relevant objectives include
deterrence of the defendant and the public, rehabilitation, and punishment or
retribution. Stevens, 146 ldaho at -,

191 P.3d at 226 (citing State v. Cross,

132 ldaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999)).
"[Wlhen a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims his sentence is
excessive even though it is within the statutory limits, the motion must be
supported with new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732,
737, 170 P.3d 397, 402 (2007) (citing State v. Huffman, 144 ldaho 201, 203, 159
P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). When a defendant fails to support a Rule 35 motion with
new or additional information, the district court's order denying the motion will be
affirmed on appeal.

Id.

Harthsorn sought Rule 35 relief in all four of his cases. (#33914 R., pp.6468.) In his pro se Rule 35 motion, Hartshorn proclaimed his innocence to the
grand theft charge, stated the escape charge was the result of him doing "one of
the knuckle headedest [sic] things [he has] ever done," that he applied to mental
health court, and noted the "checks that were cashed were stolen last year
sometime by Shaun Combs or Coates" and the police reports indicate the checks
were written by a female. (#33914 R., pp.65-67.) Hartshorn's motion further
notes he is "BPA approved and have ben [sic] put on the waiting list for a bed at
ARC, Ontario." (#33914 R., p.79.)
Hartshorn was represented by counsel at the Rule 35 hearing who read
the Rule 35 motion and noted Hartshorn's concern that the Parole Commission
would not parole him. (Rule 35 Tr., p.5, L . l l - p.7, 1.20.) Hartshorn then

addressed the court and reiterated his belief that "they're going to make me top
out," which would make him "60 years old when [he] get[s] out." (Rule 35 Tr.,
p.7, L.23 - p.8, L.1.) Hartshorn also requested the court retain jurisdiction. (Rule
35 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.3; #33914 R., p.74.) The court denied Hartshorn's
requests to reduce his sentences. (Rule 35 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2; #33914 R., p.82.)
On appeal, Hartshorn asserts the district court abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 35 request "in view of the information available at his original
sentencing hearings, as well as the additional information presented to the
district court in conjunction with his Rule 35 motions," noting, in particular, "his
substance abuse problems and his commitment to turning his life around."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) The record supports the district court's decision.
Hartshorn has a lengthy criminal record dating back nearly thirty years. In
1980, Hartshorn was convicted of writing a check on a closed account and was
placed on probation. (PSI, p.3.) Hartshorn subsequently violated his probation
on at least two separate occasions and participated in the retained jurisdiction
program following the second violation. (PSI, p.3.)
In 1982 and 1983, Hartshorn was convicted of issuing an insufficient funds
check, receiving the benefit of retained jurisdiction for the first conviction and a
three-year indeterminate sentence for the second conviction.

(PSI, pp.3-4.)

Undeterred, Hartshorn was convicted of grand theft and issuing an insufficient
funds check again in 1988. (PSI, p.4.) At some point, Hartshorn was paroled but
he violated his parole in 1989 and again in 1990. (PSI, p.4.) Hartshorn was not
arrested on the 1990 parole violation until 1997 after he was charged with driving

under the influence in Bingham County. (PSI, pp.4, 7.) Hartshorn's parole was
revoked and he remained in custody until September 1998. (PSI, p.7.) Notably
during his final months in custody in 1998, Hartshorn received four disciplinary
reports -two for possession of contraband, one for battery, and one for failing to
obey a direct order. (PSI, pp.7, 32-35.6)
Approximately seven months after being released from custody, Hartshorn
was charged with driving under the influence and possession of a controlled
substance. (PSI, p.5.) Eight months after being placed on probation in relation
Hartshorn violated his probation.
to the driving under the influence con~iction,~
(PSI, p.5.)

Two years later, Hartshorn was charged with possession of a

controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and
open container. (PSI, p.5.) Fifteen months after that, Hartshorn was charged
with leaving the scene of accident and resisting or obstructing officers, and was
again given the opportunity for probation. (PSI, p.6.)
While on probation, the state charged Hartshorn with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver in Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No.
33914), and Hartshorn was, once again, placed on probation. (At33914 R., pp.67, 49; PSI, p.7.) As previously noted, in the six months that followed, the state
charged Hartshorn with escape, grand theft, aggravated assault, and four counts
of issuing a check without funds. (#33915 R., pp.4-5; #33916 R., pp.4-5; #33917
R., pp.4-5.)

Unnumbered pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively.
The possession of a controlled substance charged was dismissed. (PSI, p.5.)
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When the district court imposed sentence in Case No. CR-06-5769, the
court specifically took into account Hartshorn's substance abuse problem,
required him to, as a condition of his probation, "complete any substance abuse
evaluation and treatment recommended by [his] probation officer," required him
to "apply to the inpatient ARA program," and told Hartshorn that if he was
accepted into that program, and a bed was available within 60 days, the court
would "suspend the balance of the 60 days . .

.

ordered a s a condition of

probation" so that Hartshorn could "go over to ARA." (#33914, 8/7/06 Tr., p.15,
L.22

-

p.16, L.5.)

Notwithstanding this opportunity, Hartshorn violated his

probation by committing several additional offenses.
After Hartshorn violated his probation and was before the court for
disposition of his probation violation and for sentencing in the three other cases
at issue in this appeal, Hartshorn again offered his substance abuse problem as
an explanation for his behavior, and advised the court he was "BPA-approved for
treatment in Ontario, Oregon." (#33914, 12/18/06 Tr., p.24, L.18-20, p.27, L.4.)
The court noted it "considered [Hartshorn's] statements, the recommendations of
both attorneys, [and] the nature and circumstances of the crimes" and ordered
Hartshorn's sentence executed in Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 33914),
and imposed a consecutive one-year fixed sentence in Case No. CR-06-14327
(Docket No. 33915), a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed in Case
No. CR-06-17236, and a unified twelve-year sentence with four year fixed in
Case No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), with the latter two sentences to run
concurrent with the sentence in case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 33914).

(#33914, Tr., p.27, L.16

-

p.28, L.18.)

In light of Hartshorn's long criminal

history, his inability to comply with the terms of probation or parole, and his
continued criminal offending despite various attempts at treatment and
rehabilitation, Hartshorn has failed to establish his sentences were excessive as
imposed.
Hartshorn has likewise failed to establish he was entitled to Rule 35 relief
because, despite his claims to the contrary, he failed to present any new
information in support of his motion. Both his substance abuse problem and his
alleged "commitment to turning his life around" as evidenced by his inquiry into
participation in the BPA program were before the court at the time of sentencing.
As such, the court correctly noted at the Rule 35 hearing that Hartshorn failed to
provide "any real new information" (Rule 35 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7), and denied relief
noting Hartshorn's sentences were "proper" (Rule 35 Tr., p.11, L.2). Hartshorn
has failed to establish otherwise.
Because Hartshorn's sentences were not excessive as imposed, and
because Hartshorn failed to provide any new information in support of his request
for Rule 35 relief, he has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's
sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Hartshorn's convictions
and sentences.
DATED this 18th day of August 2009.
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